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Goldstein: Searches and Seizures

YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN DRUNK:
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF IMPLIED CONSENT THROUGH
FIFTH AMENDMENT VOLUNTARINESS STANDARDS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Perez1
(decided August 2, 2012)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The prosecution charged the defendant, Hector Perez, with
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.2 On June 5,
2012, the Supreme Court of Kings County held a combined
Mapp/Huntley hearing to decide the admissibility of seized evidence
and statements made to the police by the defendant on the night of his
arrest.3 The defendant was arrested at the home of his girlfriend, Elsa
Diaz, on February 5, 2011, after an altercation involving her grandson, Cesar Pabon.4 Officers were called to the building and then
sought Ms. Diaz’s consent to search her apartment.5 Consent was
granted, but the defendant challenged the prosecution’s use of her
consent.6 The defendant argued that Ms. Diaz’s consent was not given with the requisite degree of voluntariness, for a number of reasons,
including her level of intoxication.7
Voluntary consent to search can only be given as “a true act
of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and uncon-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

951 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 339.
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 341.
Id. at 343.
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strained choice.”8 Both the United States Supreme Court and the
New York Court of Appeals have determined that voluntarily granting officers consent to search is a valid exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.9 Consent searches are one of the
most useful tools in law enforcement’s repertoire.10 Obtaining consent can help an officer seize evidence that could be destroyed in the
time it would take to obtain a warrant.11 Because of the value and
broad possibility of intrusion on personal liberty associated with this
type of search, prosecutors bear a heavy burden in establishing that
consent to search was voluntarily given.12
The voluntariness of an individual’s grant of consent can be
challenged in a variety of ways as was done in Perez.13 This Note focuses on one aspect, the effects of intoxication on an individual’s
ability to freely consent to a search.14 As this Note demonstrates, the
prosecution must satisfy what is in reality an extremely deferential
standard when showing that an individual is too intoxicated to understand his or her choice to consent. Establishing that an individual is
overly intoxicated negates the voluntariness of his consent to the
search,15 however, in New York, proving that an individual is too impaired to consent is exceedingly difficult.16 This standard, which
weakens the effect of subjective intoxication on the validity of consent, is useful, providing an excellent model for analyzing a different
type of consent search—the implied consent statute created in con-

8

People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is well settled under the
Fourth Amendment that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is
‘per se unreasonable . . . .’ It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established
exceptions . . . is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); see Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580
(incorporating the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test into New York Law).
10
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (reasoning that frequently officers will suspect illicit activity, but not have the required probable cause, and in those circumstances a valid consent
search will be the only means of obtaining the evidence).
11
Id.
12
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (holding that the State bears the burden of
establishing an exceptional situation to justify a warrantless search).
13
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 341, 343-44, 346 (compiling and assessing defendant’s multiple
challenges to the voluntariness of consent).
14
See infra Parts III-V (discussing the effect of intoxication or mental impairment on the
validity of voluntary consent to search).
15
See infra Part III (discussing the Schompert mania test for determining whether intoxication affects the voluntariness of a grant of consent).
16
Id.
9
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junction with New York’s driving under the influence law.17
Because of the expansive use and high value of consent
searches, the New York legislature was the first in the country to create an implied consent statute for drivers within the state.18 Drivers
in all fifty states, as a condition of accepting a license, consent to a
search of their body for the presence of drugs or alcohol in connection with an arrest for driving under the influence.19 However, in
New York, this consent is qualified by a statutorily created right to
revoke this implied consent and refuse the test.20 Legislation has recently been proposed to weaken the right to refuse21 in an effort to
deter driving under the influence22 and help combat one of the most
dangerous activities affecting our society.23 The standards discussed
in the traditional consent search context suggest that the time has
come for approval of this legislation,24 reflecting important and needed changes,25 strengthening the validity of implied consent and weakening the right to refuse a search.
II.

THE OPINION: PEOPLE V. PEREZ
On the evening of February 5, 2011, the defendant, Hector

17

See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney 2013) (granting the State implied
consent to search any individual over the age of twenty-one who operates a motor vehicle,
for the presence of drugs or alcohol, if arrested for driving under the influence) [hereinafter
VTL].
18
Penn Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 39 n.2 (1978).
19
Id. at 39; 2011 S.B 3768 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (highlighting that nine states have a
stronger version of an implied consent law).
20
See VTL § 1194(2)-(3) (creating, penalizing, and limiting a statutorily created right to
refuse the chemical test, and revoke implied consent).
21
2011 S.B 3768 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (proposing an elimination of the right to refuse
in New York whenever an officer has probable cause to suspect an individual of driving under the influence).
22
Id. (suggesting this legislation would “add real teeth to the implied consent provision”
in VTL § 1194).
23
See Drunk Driving Facts, MADD, http://www.MADD.org/drunk-driving/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012) (stating that 350,000 people a year are killed or seriously injured by drunk
driving).
24
See infra Parts III-VII.
25
Maine received the top score in the nation as just twenty-three people died in DUI related deaths, in part because of the state’s partial denial of the right to refuse. MADD–Maine,
MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/state-stats/Maine.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2013).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 13

1220

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Perez, was staying at the home of his girlfriend, Elsa Diaz.26 Ms. Diaz lived in the same apartment building as Emerson and Hernan Hernandez, two friends of her grandson, Cesar Pabon.27 While Mr.
Pabon was visiting the Hernandez brothers, he went downstairs to
speak with his grandmother, Ms. Diaz.28 During Mr. Pabon’s conversation with Ms. Diaz, the defendant came out of the apartment and
began to argue with her.29 The defendant then momentarily left the
argument, re-entered the apartment, and returned allegedly brandishing a handgun.30 Mr. Pabon, who witnessed the incident, testified at
the hearing that both Ms. Diaz and the defendant were intoxicated
during this altercation.31
The police, who were called because of the incident, arrived
about fifteen minutes later.32 During that time, Mr. Pabon and the
Hernandez brothers physically assaulted and locked the defendant in
the basement.33 The police searched the basement of the apartment
building after breaking up the fight, but found nothing.34 After the
fruitless search, police officer Gabriel Cuevas noticed Ms. Diaz who
was “shaking and mumbling.”35 The officer offered Ms. Diaz assistance, which she refused, and then began to question her about the
presence of any guns in the apartment.36 Ms. Diaz admitted that the
defendant lived in her apartment, but refused to say anything about a
gun.37 Officer Cuevas then requested permission to search the apartment, and Ms. Diaz responded by claiming that “she was not aware
of any gun in the apartment.”38
Ms. Diaz then reluctantly agreed to let officers conduct the
39
search. Officer Cuevas retrieved a consent-to-search form from his
patrol car, which Ms. Diaz signed.40 Once inside the apartment, Of26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ficer Cuevas began to search the bedroom. 41 When searching a filing
cabinet within the bedroom, Officer Cuevas discovered an unloaded
revolver and a box of fifty rounds of ammunition, and he then called
for backup.42 Ms. Diaz noticed this, began screaming uncontrollably,
and had to be detained by the officers.43 Mr. Pabon subsequently
identified the weapon as the one the defendant threatened him with.44
The defendant was arrested and later indicted for criminal possession
of a weapon.45
The court in Perez began by laying out the procedural requirements for a challenge to a search, stating the hallmark of search
challenges: that any warrantless search of a home conducted without
a warrant is per se unreasonable.46 In the instant case, no warrant
was sought.47 When no warrant is sought, but there is ample time to
obtain one the prosecution bears a heavy burden in establishing the
search was conducted reasonably.48 As stated above, voluntarily
granting consent to search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s typical requirement of a warrant and probable cause.49 Therefore, if Ms. Diaz’s consent to search was given voluntarily, the search
would be reasonable and constitutional as long as officers did not exceed the scope of that consent.50
Before assessing the intoxication challenge to the consent
search, the court in Perez first dealt with the threshold issue of per-

41

Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
Id. at 339-40.
43
Id. at 340.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219).
47
Id. at 342.
48
Id. at 340 (citing People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531, 535 (N.Y. 1981)).
49
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (defining the voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement).
50
See id. (establishing that once voluntary consent has been established the search has
been conducted validly). The search, however, must remain within the scope of the consent
given. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (setting up an objective reasonableness
test for determining whether an officer’s search exceeded the scope of the voluntary consent). Coercion, when present, invalidates the consent, and consequently the search. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). Coercion means that an individual acquiesced to authority, and did not possess the requisite free and unconstrained state of mind
needed for voluntariness. Id. at 548-50. For an overview of the elements, concerns, and
practical considerations assessed in determining whether voluntary consent was established,
in New York and Federal law see Daniel Fier, Note, It’s In The Bag: Voluntariness, Scope,
and the Authority to Grant Consent, 28 TOURO L. REV. 687 (2012).
42
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sonal standing.51 The court also assessed the defendant’s other challenges, namely that Ms. Diaz did not have the authority to grant consent and that her consent was not given voluntarily.52 While the court
in Perez decided that the defendant passed the threshold test,53 it ultimately concluded that although Ms. Diaz had the authority to consent to the search,54 she did not do so voluntarily,55 and therefore ordered the suppression of the seizures of the gun and the
ammunition.56
One of the defendant’s challenges to the validity of Ms. Di51

Personal standing is defined as a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises
searched, or the thing seized, and is required before a search can be challenged. Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 128 (1978).
52
The defendant argued that Ms. Diaz did not have the requisite authority to grant consent
to search because he was a co-occupant of the residence, and that Ms. Diaz did not consent
to the search of the premises voluntarily. Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 342, 344, 345.
53
The test of personal standing has an objective and subjective component, which examine whether the defendant took steps to preserve the property, and whether society is willing
to accept his or her connection to the property as reasonable. People v. Ramirez-Portoreal,
666 N.E.2d 207, 212 (N.Y. 1996). The defendant stayed in Ms. Diaz’s home most weekend
nights and left clothing there to be washed. Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 342. Additionally, Ms.
Diaz identified part of the bedroom as the defendant’s side, and the defendant was held to
have established the required expectation of privacy to meet the test of personal standing.
Id.
54
An individual must have the requisite degree of control over the premises to grant consent. People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1979). Although consent cannot be
given over the objection of a co-occupant when he or she is present, if one co-tenant is not
present, or does not object, the other co-occupant’s grant of consent is valid, and officers
may conduct the search. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006). The defendant
was not present and therefore, Ms. Diaz had the requisite authority to grant permission for a
search of the apartment and the filing cabinet in the bedroom. Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 34445.
55
By definition, consent must be given voluntarily, and is incompatible with official coercion of any kind. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580. The court in Gonzalez identified five factors, viewed in the totality of the circumstances with no one factor being determinative, that
are assessed to determine whether coercion invalidates a grant of consent to search:
[W]hether the consenter was in custody at the time she gave her consent;
whether the consenter acted evasively in her encounter with the police;
any threats or coercive techniques employed by the police prior to the
obtaining of consent; whether the officers advised the consenter that she
has the right to refuse to consent to the requested search; and the number
of law enforcement personnel present when consent to search was granted.
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (citing Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575) (citations omitted). Applying
this test, the court in Perez found several of these factors weighed in favor of the defendant,
particularly the fifth factor, as a total of fourteen officers were present at the time Ms. Diaz
consented to the search, and her consent was therefore involuntary, and constituted a mere
submission to lawful authority. Id. at 345-46.
56
Id. at 346.
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az’s consent concerned her mental state at the time she gave consent.57 Defendant argued that Ms. Diaz was too intoxicated to have
the requisite state of mind to grant police a valid consent to search.58
The court in Perez rejected this argument and set out the high standard that must be met for an individual’s intoxication or impairment to
invalidate his or her consent to search.59 A defendant must prove that
the individual who granted consent was so intoxicated that he or she
reached the level of mania, or an inability to remain in touch with the
reality of the situation.60 Although Ms. Diaz had to be restrained by
officers, admitted to having multiple drinks that evening, and appeared as if she were shaking and mumbling, the court held her intoxication did not meet the requisite level.61 What is important, however, is not the specific result, but rather the analysis used by the court
in Perez, which was the same analysis used by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.62
III.

THE SCHNECKLOTH DEFINITION OF “VOLUNTARY”: THE
INCORPORATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT CONFESSION
STANDARDS

In Schneckloth, the Court was faced the difficult task of defining the word “voluntary,” specifically what “the prosecutor [must]
prove to demonstrate that a consent was ‘voluntarily’ given.”63 The
Court began by examining what it considered to be the most extensive judicial attempt to define this elusive phrase—the standards applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession under the protections of the Fifth Amendment.64
While the Fifth Amendment voluntariness cases did not provide a talismanic definition of the word, several relevant concerns

57

Id. at 343.
Id.
59
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (“The requirement of ‘mania’ is . . . reflected in the level of
intoxication required to negate an individual’s consent to search[;] . . . consent . . . is admissible when [the individual is] sufficiently sober to have understood his rights and to have
acted voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”); Id. at 343 (holding there was no evidence
Ms. Diaz met this standard despite her aberrant behavior, and visible intoxication).
60
Id. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the mania standard in New York law.
61
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 340.
62
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
63
Id. at 223.
64
Id. at 223-24.
58
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were identified and fleshed out.65 The main concern was the effect of
subjective knowledge on the choice to voluntarily consent to a
search,66 an important consideration because in this context, the item
sought to be proven is literally an individual’s subjective
knowledge.67 Two protective safeguards have developed for situations when a court is attempting to define an individual’s subjective
voluntariness. These safeguards are the knowing choice requirement68 and the formal waiver requirement.69 However, the Court
held these protections were unnecessary in the consent search context.70
The Court reasoned that although it was adopting elements of
the Fifth Amendment test for the voluntariness of a confession, it was
excluding the more protective requirements because of specific considerations supporting the Fourth Amendment.71 These considerations, such as encouraging free communication with law enforcement, informed the Court’s ultimate holding that voluntariness would
be analyzed by the same basic test as the confession context. The test
requires that in order to find a voluntary grant of consent, the totality
of the circumstances, specifically, whether the statement was made
freely and with an unconstrained mind, should be examined.72 However, the more protective safeguards were found to be unnecessary in

65
Id. at 224 (rejecting a literal definition of a voluntary choice as a knowing choice, as
even a choice made under torture literally represents a choice between two definite possibilities, and rejecting a “but for” test asking whether the statement would have been made absent official action, as under that test no statement could ever be considered voluntary).
66
Id. at 224-25 (reasoning that looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine
subjective voluntariness reflects an important set of values, that include both the police need
to question citizens to determine the truth, and the individual interest in preventing the criminal law from becoming an instrument of unfairness).
67
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230.
68
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (requiring that before a defendant’s
statements be used against him, he must be informed of his right to remain silent, so that his
subsequent choice to speak despite this becomes a knowing and voluntary one).
69
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 488 (1981) (requiring that for certain pretrial protections, such as the right to assistance of counsel, a defendant must do more than
make a knowing choice; there must be a formal waiver, “[a]n intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege”).
70
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
71
Id. at 234, 245 (reasoning that voluntariness is possible without a formal waiver or
knowledge, and that other formal requirements could frustrate otherwise reasonable police
activity, and rejecting these protections in favor of the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate goal,
merely securing individuals from unreasonable intrusions).
72
Id. at 248-49.
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this field.73 Therefore, what is important about Schneckloth is not
what it added to the test of consent, but what it excluded.74
The Court first explained why the knowing choice requirement was unnecessary in the consent search context. This requirement was articulated in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s protections over confessions and requires that an individual be informed of
his or right to refuse to make a particular statement.75 However, the
Court rejected applying this requirement to the consent to search context for several reasons, reflecting both practical and policy based
considerations.76
In the context of a confession, the Fifth Amendment’s protections are necessary because the statement is made in a custodial situation which can significantly affect the individual’s rights.77 The privilege against self-incrimination requires that an individual have
knowledge of their right to refuse to confess, and officers suffer the
risk that, if the right to refuse is not effectively communicated, they
may lose the use of that confession.78 However, injecting the knowing choice requirement into the consent search would hamper important functions protected by the Fourth Amendment;79 namely, the
individual’s ability to freely communicate with law enforcement to
help apprehend criminals,80 and law enforcement’s ability to courteously, and without any assertion of authority, ask individuals questions that aid in investigations.81 This distinction was further supported in the Court’s opinion, by the non-custodial locations in which
consent to search is typically requested, such as a car, home, or office.82 In fact, a key case on voluntary confessions, Miranda v. Ari73

Id. at 234, 245.
Id.
75
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
76
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.
77
Id. at 232; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (“The very fact of [a] custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”).
78
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
79
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 284-85.
80
Id. at 243 (“ ‘It is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals . . . . ’ Rather, the community has a strong interest in encouraging consent, for the
resulting search may yield necessary evidence . . . that may insure that a wholly innocent
person is not wrongly charged.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488
(1971))).
81
Id. at 230-31.
82
Id. at 231-32.
74
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zona,83 expressly made this distinction, excluding “general on-thescene questioning” from its protective holding.84
The distinction between confessions and consent searches is
also supported by practical considerations, specifically, situations in
which two different statements take place.85 When an individual is
making a confession in a custodial setting, they are protected by the
Fifth Amendment; as such, officers are more likely to have the ability
to effectively communicate the right to refuse.86 However, an on-thescene request for consent, protected by the Fourth Amendment, is
part of the way law enforcement has to operate, and it is essential that
an officer be able to follow an impromptu investigative lead.87 The
police would undoubtedly be severely hampered by having to pause
and inform the individual of his or her right to refuse.88 The Court in
Schneckloth reasoned that this particular consideration explains why
its prior decisions, in the consent search context, focused on the totality of the circumstances and not the knowing choice requirement.89
The Court in Schneckloth also declined to add a requirement
that a formal waiver be required as an element of voluntary consent.90
A formal, knowing waiver of constitutional rights is required in many
circumstances which implicate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment’s protections over pre-trial procedure.91 Protections over rights, such as
assistance of counsel, help “promote the fair ascertainment of truth at
a criminal trial,” a value at the heart of our society, and without
which, “justice will not . . . be done.”92 Therefore, the reason these
pre-trial procedures are protected by a formal waiver requirement is
that they are of a “wholly different order” than the reasons for ensur83

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232. See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477) (“Our decision today
is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating
crime. . . . General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime [is therefore] . . . not affected by our holding.”).
85
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232 (reasoning that consent searches are undertaken in an atmosphere that is “immeasurably far removed from [a] custodial interrogation”).
86
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
87
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32.
88
Id. at 231.
89
Id. at 234 (“Implicit in all of these cases [discussing the consent search exception] is the
recognition that knowledge of a right to refuse is not a perquisite to a voluntary consent.”).
90
Id. at 245.
91
Id. at 237 (listing a variety of circumstances where a knowing and intelligent waiver is
required before a defendant can waive his or her rights including, the right to refuse counsel,
to confrontation, to a jury trial, and to a speedy trial, amongst others).
92
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236, 242.
84
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ing the protections of the Fourth Amendment.93 The protections of
the Fourth Amendment, unlike the pre-trial protections, have never
been thought of as completely and entirely necessary to maintain the
societal interest in truth and justice. In other words, the formal waiver is not required because an individual could receive a fair and just
resolution at trial without this protection.94 Additionally, the requirement of a formal waiver would frustrate authorities, much like
the knowing choice requirement would, because it could not be effectively established in the field.95 Without the important policy justifications requiring officers to go through the complex task of determining whether the waiver had been established, there was no need to
force officers to undertake this task.96 The Court added there was also an inherent fairness in allowing an individual to consent to a
search, even without specific knowledge or waiver of his or her
rights.97 This fairness stems from the implicit assumption that law
enforcement’s conduct when consent is granted may be identical to
what occurs when officers seek a warrant.98 This assumption also
furthers the strong societal interest in encouraging cooperation with
the police.99 In essence, the Court in Schneckloth rejected requirements of knowing choice and of formal waiver because these elements are incompatible with both the policy and practicalities underlying the use of the Fourth Amendment.100
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONS OF INTOXICATION: THE
SCHOMPERT MANIA STANDARD

The Court in Schneckloth was able to borrow a test that not
only protected individual rights, but also fit the investigatory needs of
the consent search.101 This test defines voluntariness in an identical
93

Id. at 242.
Id. (reasoning that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are of a lesser order,
and are not vital to the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial).
95
Id. at 245 (“It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context
of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make
the detailed type of examination demanded” by the waiver requirement.).
96
Id. at 246.
97
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.
98
Id. at 243.
99
Id
100
Id. at 248-49.
101
Id. at 224-25 (“Voluntariness [reflects] an accommodation of the complex of values
implicated in police questioning of a suspect [including the] . . . need for police questioning
94
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manner to the definition utilized in determining whether a confession
was voluntarily given.102 Therefore, common real world circumstances that may affect an individual’s ability to speak freely are analyzed under the same test.103 This Section will look at a commonly
occurring circumstance, mental impairment due to intoxication, and
show how courts in New York have analyzed the effect of this mental
state on the validity of a voluntary consent to search.
The court in Perez used this test to reach its conclusion that
intoxication did not have an effect on whether Ms. Diaz’s consent
was voluntary.104 Although Ms. Diaz’s consent was found not to be
given freely for other reasons, had those circumstances not existed,
her intoxication alone would likely not have hindered her ability to
speak voluntarily.105
The showing required to establish that an individual does not
meet the test of voluntariness because of intoxication is a high one;
the individual must prove that he or she reached the point of “mania,”
or that he or she was so intoxicated that they were “unable to comprehend the meaning of [their] words.”106 This standard, which was
borrowed from the context of voluntary confessions and applied to
the consent search context, was first articulated in New York in People v. Schompert.107
In Schompert, the defendant, a chronic alcoholic with a history of psychosis, was convicted of grand larceny and burglary.108 The
defendant was so intoxicated that, while drinking in a bar, he chose to
call the police himself and confess to his crimes.109 Officers testified
that the defendant was in an advanced state of alcoholic intoxication
and “on the verge of delirium tremens” when police spoke to him.110
[and] . . . civilized notions of justice.”).
102
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 227.
103
See, e.g., Mary West, Intoxication, 32 Carmody-Wait 2d § 176:104 (2013) (compiling
precedent analyzing different types of intoxication, and an individual’s ability to speak voluntarily).
104
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
105
Id. at 343, 345 (“In this case, although Mr. Pabon testified that his grandmother was
intoxicated, there is no evidence that Ms. Diaz appeared confused, disoriented or unsure
about what was occurring when interacting with the police.”).
106
Id. at 343 (citing People v. Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d 909, 909 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002);
People v. Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985)).
107
226 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1967).
108
Id. at 306-07.
109
Id. at 307.
110
Id. Delirium tremens is a very severe form of alcohol withdrawal, and involves sudden

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/13

12

Goldstein: Searches and Seizures

2013]

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1229

The defendant had been released just days before from the hospital,
where he was treated for alcoholism and psychosis.111 When the police arrived at the bar they did not believe the defendant’s drunken
bragging, presumably because of his advanced intoxication and the
peculiar circumstances.112 However, the defendant insisted on proving his guilt, and at his request, police took him to the bus station
where he opened a locker and revealed the stolen goods.113 The question presented to the Court of Appeals was whether his confession
could still be considered voluntary despite his “evidently high degree
of alcoholic intoxication.”114
The court held that, because the principal reason for excluding
a confession was to limit the possibility of coercion by authorities
and not to protect wrongdoers, a confession should be deemed valid
if the defendant is sufficiently in touch with the realities of the situation.115 The principal question that must be examined is the trustworthiness and reliability of the statement, not the specific level of intoxication of the speaker.116 Without the speaker’s intoxication reaching
the rare level of mania, eliminating the speaker’s ability to understand the specifics of the circumstances around him, the confession
would be deemed voluntary.117 The court held that as long as the police do not cause the defendant’s intoxication, the general presumption is that the typical rules of trustworthiness and admissibility apply.118 Utilizing this test, the court held the confession was voluntary,
despite the defendant’s extreme intoxication.119 The statement was
also deemed highly reliable and trustworthy because the evidence
was recovered shortly after the confession.120
The requirement of “mania,” the inability to comprehend reality, as set out in Schompert, appears to be an exceedingly difficult
one to prove; courts have held confessions to be voluntary in a numand severe mental or nervous system changes, including but not limited to confusion, agitation, hallucinations, and seizures. David C. Dugdale, Delirium Tremens, PUBMED HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001771/ (last visited May 9, 2013).
111
Schompert, 266 N.E.2d at 307.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 306-07.
115
Id. at 307-08.
116
Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 309.
117
Id. at 308.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 307.
120
Id.
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ber of outrageous circumstances, particularly circumstances where a
high degree of individual impairment is evident to most people based
on common sense and experience.121 In People v. Roth,122 the defendant sold drugs to an undercover informant after admitting that he
had been “freebasing”123 crack-cocaine for over twenty hours.124 In
People v. Perry,125 the defendant made his confession while under the
influence of numerous mind-altering drugs, including cocaine and alcohol.126 In People v. Kehn,127 the defendant was so intoxicated that
he remembered absolutely nothing, including confessing to or committing the crime.128 The defendant’s blackout in Kehn lasted from
the time he was a passenger in a car, the evening before the crime,
until the next morning when he awoke in a jail cell.129 In People v.
Adams,130 the defendant, who suffered from a serious mental illness,
ingested the same sleeping pills she gave her husband before attacking him.131 These pills were so strong, and affected the victim so
strongly, that he was bludgeoned to death without even stirring.132
However, none of these defendants’ confessions were held to be
made involuntarily because of their impairment.133 All of these defendants were deemed to be sufficiently in touch with the realities of
their individual situations to confess voluntarily.134 While the court
in Schompert specifically held that it was theoretically possible for a
defendant’s confession to be made involuntarily because of their in121

See David J. Hanson, How Alcohol Affects Us: The Biphasic Curve, ALCOHOL:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/HealthIssues/1100827422.html
(last visited May 9, 2013) (demonstrating how in many individuals, a minimum of two
drinks can bring an individual to a level of intoxication that would affect their ability to
drive, and cause euphoria).
122
527 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988).
123
“Freebasing” is the act of preparing to use cocaine in a very specific, and dangerous
manner, involving taking purified solid cocaine, mixing it an alkaloid base, and then heating
it over a metallic surface.
124
Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
125
535 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1988).
126
Id. at 34.
127
486 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985).
128
Id. at 382.
129
Id.
130
257 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1970).
131
Id. at 610-11.
132
Id.
133
Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 100; Perry, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 382;
Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 613.
134
Id.
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toxication,135 it seems difficult to imagine a scenario that would meet
this criterion.136
V.

THE SCOPE OF INTOXICATED CONSENT: LESSONS TAKEN
FROM COMBINING SCHNECKLOTH AND SCHOMPERT

The Schompert mania standard relies on the basic definition
of voluntariness set out in Schneckloth,137 and has been used to determine whether consent to search has been voluntarily given despite
an individual’s intoxication.138 As such, it would seem to be equally
difficult to establish that an individual was too intoxicated to give a
valid consent to search.139 However, Schneckloth’s second holding,
that the knowing choice and waiver requirements are not applicable
in assessing the voluntariness of a search, is more useful to a discussion of the effect of intoxication on the validity of consent.140 Excluding these requirements is important because the limitations presented by the knowing choice and waiver requirements helped
fashion the only limit presented by the court in Schompert. Specifically, in Schompert the court held that it was possible for a confession to be made involuntarily because of alcoholic mania. 141 The
court reasoned that this would be possible for example if someone
was unconscious but still somehow confessing.142 This hypothetical
was based on the fact that while unconscious there would be no pos135

Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308.
For example in Roth, the defendant admitted to ingesting cocaine by freebasing or
smoking it for a period of twenty-five hours. Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 99. According to the
National Drug Administration, ingesting cocaine in this manner, for that extended period of
time could cause hallucinations, or even full-blown paranoid psychosis, and death. Drug
Facts: Cocaine, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/
drugfacts/cocaine (last visited May 9, 2013). If a scenario such as the one in Roth did not
invalidate the voluntariness of the statement, the question is begged whether any human being could be intoxicated enough to invalidate his or her statement without dying because of
their intoxication.
137
Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 307.
138
See, e.g., Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002) (using the
Schompert mania standard to determine whether a defendant’s intoxication invalidated his
voluntary grant of consent to search).
139
See Roth, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 100; Perry, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Kehn, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 382;
Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 613.
140
See supra Part III (discussing how the Court in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, refused to
apply the protective requirements of a knowing choice, and intelligent waiver to the context
of Fourth Amendment consent searches).
141
Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 305.
142
Id.
136

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 13

1232

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

sibility of informing the individual of the consequences of his
choice.143
However, as the Court held in Schneckloth, the policy interests behind the Fourth Amendment are of a lesser order, merely
providing security against arbitrary intrusions by police.144 It follows
then that an individual’s grant of consent while intoxicated would
have essentially only one major limitation, which is that the statement
never be coerced.145 In fact, in People v. Kates,146 the Court of Appeals reached the result suggested as inappropriate by the hypothetical in Schompert147 when it permitted a search of a defendant’s body
while he was unconscious, pursuant to a previously existing valid
grant of consent.148 In Kates, the defendant was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and causing a fatal car wreck.149 After
interviewing witnesses, officers went to examine the defendant in the
emergency room of a nearby hospital.150 When officers arrived at the
hospital, the defendant was essentially unconscious; he was too intoxicated and disoriented to object or refuse the officers’ requests to perform a blood test.151 Relying on the implied consent law discussed in
the next Section, the court in Kates found that the defendant had given consent in advance of the crash for a search of his blood for the
presence of alcohol, and that officers had acted constitutionally when
relying on that consent and taking a blood sample.152
143

Id. at 308.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.
145
Id. at 247 (“There is no reason to believe . . . that the response to a policeman’s [request for consent] is presumptively coerced.”).
146
428 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 1981).
147
Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308 (refusing a per se rule that intoxication has no effect on
voluntariness, because of the possibility that an individual could be so intoxicated he or she
would not be sufficiently in touch with their faculties to voluntarily confess). Although the
grant of consent in Kates occurred before the defendant became intoxicated, his consent extended beyond the time he drank himself into unconsciousness. Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 44748.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 447.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (holding that the blood test was constitutional under the statutorily granted consent and pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement). See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that exigent circumstances, and the ready destructibility of evidence permits officers to take a blood test
from an arrestee if they suspect him or her of driving under the influence of alcohol, because
the evidence consists of alcohol in the bloodstream, which rapidly deteriorates after he or she
stops drinking).
144
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NEW YORK DUI PROCEDURE: IMPLIED CONSENT AND THE
RIGHT TO REFUSE

New York State has expanded the distinction between protected confessions and searches with its implied consent law.153
Since 1953, drivers in New York have impliedly consented to a
search of their bodies for the presence of alcohol, simply by operating
a motor vehicle.154 Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”)
section 1194, drivers are deemed to have given consent for a search
of their “breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of determining” the alcohol or drug content of the sample.155 This sample can
only be seized if the officer has probable cause to believe an individual committed the offense of driving while intoxicated and the sample is requested within two hours after the arrest.156
However, the New York driver does have a right to revoke
this consent.157 In 1953, the legislature added the right to refuse to
“avoid the unpleasantness” associated with “administering a chemical
test on an unwilling subject.”158 But the right to refuse is in no way
constitutionally necessary. 159 In fact, the United States Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals have determined that the right to refuse is merely a grace provided by the legislature.160 The right to refuse in New York functions as follows: a report of the individual’s
refusal is issued, and their driver’s license is temporarily suspended
pending a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to
believe the defendant was intoxicated and whether the defendant was
adequately warned of the consequences of his or her refusal. 161 If the
prosecution prevails at the hearing, the defendant’s license is suspended for twelve to eighteen months, and he or she is also required
to pay civil penalties of at least five-hundred dollars.162 However, in
153
Implied consent means that an individual consents to a search by engaging in a specific
activity, for example a search of his or her body by choosing to operate a motor vehicle.
VTL § 1194(2).
154
People v. Daniel, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1981) (“Present section
1194 has its origin in chapter 854 of the laws of 1953.”).
155
VTL § 1194(2)(a)(1)-(4).
156
Id. at § 1194(2)(a)(1).
157
Id. at § 1194(2).
158
People v. Haitz, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57, 60 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1978).
159
Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757).
160
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983); Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448.
161
VTL § 1194(2)(b)-(c).
162
Id. at § 1194 (1)(c)-(2).
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some circumstances the right to refuse can be overridden by police
pursuant to a court order.163 This occurs when the police or district
attorney’s office requests and obtains a court order compelling the
individual to undergo the test.164 In the current state of the law, however, the prosecuting authority can only seek such an order if the
driver killed or caused serious physical injury to someone other than
themselves.165
In December of 2010, Ray LaHood, the United States Secretary of Transportation, called for all states to weaken or eliminate a
driver’s right to refuse.166 Senator Fuschillo of the New York State
Legislature attempted to introduce this policy into New York law,
and sought to eliminate the right to refuse contained in VTL section
1194.167 The bill presented the justification that because of the right
to refuse, prosecutors are often forced to proceed to trial without the
sole piece of objective evidence that would prove their case, and
therefore, many defendants opt for the civil penalties and license revocation.168
The change in refusal procedure presented by Fuschillo’s bill
is an important one. If an arrestee refuses the search, an officer
would be required to request a court order compelling the defendant
to submit to the test.169 The officer would have to certify under oath
that there is probable cause to believe the individual committed the
offense of driving while intoxicated.170 The court order could be
sought in any case where there is probable cause to suspect the defendant committed the offense, and not just in cases where injury or
death has occurred.171 The committee report asserts that this “would
add real teeth to the implied consent provision.”172 Additionally, as
will be discussed in the next Section, the standards utilized in Perez
163

Id. at § 1194 (3).
Id. at § 1194 (3)(d).
165
Id. at § 1194 (3)(b)(1) (“Court ordered chemical tests . . . [are] authorized . . . [upon a
finding that the driver] . . . was the operator of a motor vehicle and in the course of such operation a person other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical injury . . . .”).
166
U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Holiday Drunk Driving Crackdown, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-209-10.
167
S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
164
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have already developed a model that balances individual liberties
with the bite that the new legislation seeks to add to New York implied consent law.
VII.

THE EXPANSION OF IMPLIED CONSENT: A BETTER MODEL
FOR ELIMINATING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE

As the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have held, eliminating the right to refuse would be constitutionally
permissible, as a defendant may be required to provide nontestimonial bodily evidence, such as blood, breath, urine, or saliva,
lawfully under the Fourth Amendment, if there is probable cause to
suspect him or her of driving under the influence.173 For whatever
reason, presumably the distasteful image of officers physically forcing drunken individuals to comply with blood tests, the right to refuse
remains alive and well in New York.174
This may be in part because the current model for assessment
of this practice focuses on its constitutionality either as a function of
the warrant requirement,175 or as a means of seizing readily destructible evidence which is a valid exception to the warrant requirement.176
While these two methods of analyzing the permissibility of the practice reach the same result as an analysis under the doctrine of consent
searches, their focus is entirely different.177 Seizures of evidence
conducted pursuant to a warrant, or the readily destructible evidence
exception focus on constraining police procedures in order to maintain the traditional balance of reasonableness.178
173

Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 (1983); Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448.
Haitz, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (asserting that the purpose of the right to refuse is to avoid
the unnecessary unpleasantness of forcing the unwilling individual to undergo the test).
175
See VTL § 1194(3)(b) (requiring officers to get a court order, founded on probable
cause to believe the driver committed the offense of DUI, essentially a warrant, to force a
defendant to undergo a compulsory chemical test).
176
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (permitting the seizure of a defendant’s blood without
a warrant because the evidence in his blood stream was readily destructible); see also Skinner v. Nat’l Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (extending Schmerber’s protections over a search to an individual’s urine and breath samples obtained for the purpose of
determining his or her level of intoxication).
177
See Kates, 428 N.E.2d at 448 (holding that the search of defendant’s blood for the
presence of alcohol was permissible as either a grant of consent, pursuant to the implied consent statute, or as a search conducted validly under Schmerber).
178
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 679 (2005) (Lynch, J., concurring) (arguing that the
purpose of probable cause and the warrant requirement is to force the government to justify
its choice of a particular investigative technique despite its intrusion into an individual’s lib174
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The consent search rationale, however, focuses on assessing
the permissibility of a particular search or seizure of evidence
through an entirely different lens. The consent search is in part about
the individual coming forward to participate in the greater goal of
ridding society of wrongdoing.179 Assessing the constitutionality of
destroying the right to refuse from this perspective presents an entirely different, and more palatable, focus.180 With the implied consent
model, the discussion is no longer about restraining police conduct,
but rather focuses on considerations that affect an individual’s mindset. This mindset centers around the legal fiction that all individuals
agree to grant the implied consent when accepting their license as
part of the societal goal of maintaining safer roads.181 The goal of
protecting drivers is furthered by expanding the scope of implied
consent searches. Under the principle of general deterrence, it is likely that if the right to refuse was removed from New York law, many
more individuals would choose to partake in society’s goal of maintaining safe and sober roadways.182 This presents a much more appealing image, in that instead of police choosing to invade on individual drivers’ lives, the focus is now on all citizens choosing to

erty interests).
179
“It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information
they have to aid in law enforcement.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78. Additionally, citizens
have a strong interest in encouraging consent searches to help ensure the accurate determination of criminal trials, and should never be discouraged from pursuing this interest.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488).
180
Compare Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (assessing whether the consenter had a subjective state of voluntariness), with Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (assessing whether an officer
was justified in invading an individual’s bodily integrity in light of his suspicions about the
individual’s suspected involvement in a crime).
181
See NY Bill Jacket, 2010 S.B. 46, ch. 169 (asserting that the purpose of implied consent and driving under the influence law is to protect individual safety when using the road).
182
S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (suggesting that eliminating the right
to refuse would strengthen the implied consent provision in VTL § 1194). Compare MADDMaine, supra note 25 (twenty-three DUI fatalities), with MADD–New York, MADD,
http://www.MADD.org/drunk-driving/state-stats/New_York.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013)
(315 DUI fatalities).
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allow this procedure to help maintain society’s safety.183
It could be argued that the drunk driver does not choose to
submit to the societal goal of maintaining safe roadways, as evidenced by his or her dangerous choice to get behind the wheel.184
However, a focus on implied consent, rather than traditional intrusion
paradigms, again provides a more tolerable image when analyzing the
role of a driver in the general scheme.185 If the right to refuse is eliminated, the driver will have made a statement, reflecting a choice,
which affects his constitutional rights, the grant of consent given at
the time he or she received a license.186 Under Schneckloth, that consent, once validly given without coercion, supports the constitutionality of the search in reliance on an individual’s choice to participate in
protecting society’s interests.187 In this situation, the search is specifically part of society’s interest in helping law enforcement’s on-thescene investigation into whether the specific crime of driving under
the influence has occurred,188 and shifts the focus towards the driver’s
choices.189
However, Schompert is what adds the key piece to the equation. Under the Schompert mania standard, intoxication has little to
no effect on the voluntariness of the statement, and the individual is
held to the consequences of his or her choice.190 When Schneckloth
and Schompert are combined, they stand for the proposition that an
183
Compare Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488 (distinguishing the interest in maintaining a safe
society by encouraging citizens to come forward with evidence that may aid law enforcement), with Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1951) (using a “shock the conscience”
test to determine whether a police action violates due process because of the inappropriate
manner in which it was conducted), and Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 (discussing the effect of
police brutality on efforts to secure testimony from witnesses as part of its holding that voluntariness is a key factor to assessing whether a confession can be used against an individual
constitutionally). “It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they have to aid in law enforcement.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78.
184
See Drunk Driving Facts, supra note 23 (highlighting that 360,000 people are killed or
injured by drunk drivers).
185
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (highlighting a variety of the individual interests furthered and protected by an individual’s ability to consent to a search, such as the community
interest in pursuing justice for all).
186
See VTL § 1194(2)(a) (“Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be
deemed to have given consent to a chemical test.”).
187
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
188
See VTL§ 1194(2)(a)(1) (requiring an in the field officer to assess whether there is
probable cause to believe the individual committed the offense of driving under the influence
before using the individual’s implied consent to require them to undergo testing).
189
See supra note 181.
190
Schompert, 226 N.E.2d at 308.
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individual, even an intoxicated individual, is held to the consequences of his or her voluntary statement.191 Therefore, it follows that intoxication should have no bearing on the scope of consent that has already been validly given in advance.192 Nor should an individual’s
subjective impairment be permitted to bear any weight on an attempt
to revoke that valid consent.193 When individuals give implied consent to search they further an important societal goal, and they have
subjective knowledge of their choice to help further that goal. Therefore, individuals cannot be allowed to attempt to revoke consent and
avoid promoting those goals because of drunken lapses in judgment.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF PEREZ
The court in Perez continued to extend two important facets
of the voluntary consent search, first, the application of Fifth
Amendment voluntary confession standards to the test of voluntariness of a grant of consent to search.194 Second, the court in Perez
continued to apply these standards correctly to the specific test of
whether intoxication has any bearing on the validity of consent.195 As
is shown by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schneckloth, the dangers
presented by a voluntary consent search are minimal, and distinguished from many other important constitutional protections.196
This leaves room for the test of voluntary consent used in Perez to be
applied to an individual’s choice to obtain a driver’s license, and
submit to a test of their body for the presence of alcohol.197 When
191

See supra Parts III-V (discussing the effect of intoxication on an individual’s subjective voluntariness and consent to search).
192
See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (using an objective reasonableness test to determine
whether an officer’s communication with a consenter presented a limit on the scope of his or
her consent). It is likely that despite an attempt to refuse, a driver’s consent under N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 1194 would not be exceeded by the scope of a search of his or her body for
alcohol if the statutory language is updated to expressly expand consent, and eliminate the
right to refuse, as was suggested by S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
193
Subjective impairment has no effect on the validity of implied consent. Kates, 428
N.E.2d at 448. Subjective impairment also has no effect on the validity of traditional grants
of consent. See Shields, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (holding that unless an individual is so intoxicated they cannot remain in touch with the world, his or her consent is valid). See also supra
Part IV.
194
Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
195
Id.
196
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27.
197
The consent is granted at the time the individual chooses to operate a vehicle under the
influence. See VTL § 1194(2)(a).
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this test is applied correctly, it supports new legislation eliminating
the right to refuse both legally,198 and practically, by providing a paradigm focusing on individual responsibility and choice.199 Undoubtedly, it is the act of a responsible citizen to come forward and aid the
police if possible,200 and the deterrent effect of eliminating the right
to refuse bolsters the impression that this is simply the right thing to
do.201 There is arguably no more responsible act for citizens of New
York than to come forward and help combat one of the greatest dangers in our society today.202
Avi Goldstein*

198

See S. Res. 3768, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (eliminating the right to refuse
from New York law). The right to refuse is nothing more than a statutory grace provided to
citizens. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565.
199
See supra note 181.
200
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243.
201
“Whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world.” Babylonian
Talmud: Sanhedrin, Folio 37a. See also supra note 182 (highlighting that lives are saved by
strengthening the right to refuse in limited circumstances). A combination of these principles justifies cracking down on drunk driving by adding strength to our implied consent
laws.
202
New York State drunk drivers cause 27% of the total traffic related deaths in the state
and cost the taxpayers over two billion dollars a year. See MADD–New York, supra note
182.
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